Labor Law 240, the Scaffold Law, in New York

What is the scaffold law?

It is the strongest statute an injured construction worker in New York has. Labor Law 240(1) requires owners, contractors and their agents to furnish scaffolds, hoists, ladders, slings, braces, ropes and similar devices “so constructed, placed and operated as to give proper protection” to workers exposed to elevation-related risk.

Three features make it different from an ordinary negligence claim:

• The duty is non-delegable. Liability attaches to the owner and general contractor whether or not they supervised the work, hired the subcontractor, or knew anything was wrong.
• Your own carelessness is not a defense. Comparative negligence, which reduces recovery in nearly every other injury case, does not apply here.
• Liability can be decided before trial. A worker can win summary judgment on liability and leave only damages for the jury.

That is why it is called absolute liability. But absolute liability is not the same as automatic recovery, which is where most published summaries go wrong.

Does every fall on a construction site qualify?

No, and this is the single most common error written about the statute.

The Court of Appeals addressed it directly in Blake v. Neighborhood Housing Services of New York City, 1 N.Y.3d 280 (2003). The court said the phrase absolute liability “may have given rise to the mistaken belief that a fall from a scaffold or ladder, in and of itself, results in an award of damages to the injured party. That is not the law, and we have never held or suggested otherwise.”

To win, the worker must show both that a required safety device was absent or inadequate and that the failure was a proximate cause of the injury. A worker who simply loses balance on a properly secured ladder, with no defect shown, does not have a 240(1) case. A worker whose ladder slides, shifts, tips or collapses for no apparent reason generally does.

What hazards does it actually cover?

Only elevation and gravity-related risks, in two forms: the worker who falls, and the object that falls on the worker. Every other construction injury runs under a different statute.

Generally covered	Generally not covered
A ladder that slides, shifts, tips or collapses	Losing balance on a sound, secured ladder with no defect shown
A scaffold without rails or proper securing	Tripping or slipping at ground level
An object that was being hoisted, or that required securing for the work	An object that fell because it was old or deteriorated
Injury from a load descending under gravity, even without a fall	A permanent staircase, treated as a normal part of the building
Commercial window washing	Routine maintenance and ordinary household window washing

How far do you have to fall?

There is no minimum height, but there is a threshold of significance. In Runner v. New York Stock Exchange, 13 N.Y.3d 599 (2009), the Court of Appeals held that a worker does not have to fall, and does not have to be struck by a falling object, for the statute to apply. The worker there was injured while lowering a heavy load.

The test the court set is whether the injuries “were the direct consequence of a failure to provide adequate protection against a risk arising from a physically significant elevation differential,” and whether the harm flows directly from the application of the force of gravity.

That said, height still matters at the margins. Courts have declined to apply the statute to short descents such as stepping down from a flatbed trailer.

What about objects that fall on you?

The rule is narrower than people expect. Under Narducci v. Manhasset Bay Associates, 96 N.Y.2d 259 (2001), “not every worker who falls at a construction site, and not any object that falls on a worker, gives rise to the extraordinary protections of Labor Law section 240(1).” A pane of glass that fell because the frame had deteriorated was an ordinary workplace hazard, not a gravity hazard the statute addresses.

Fabrizi v. 1095 Avenue of the Americas, 22 N.Y.3d 658 (2014), sharpened it: at the moment it fell, the object must have been being hoisted or secured, or must have required securing for the purposes of the undertaking. A component that merely supports something, rather than protecting the worker, is not a safety device within the statute.

Is your own carelessness a defense?

No. Labor Law 240(1) is an express exception to New York’s comparative fault rule. A worker who was partly careless still recovers in full on liability.

What defendants argue instead is sole proximate cause: not that you were partly at fault, but that you were the only cause. Under Cahill v. Triborough Bridge and Tunnel Authority, 4 N.Y.3d 35 (2004), the defendant must prove all four of these:

1. Adequate safety devices were available to the worker
2. The worker knew they were available and that he was expected to use them
3. He chose for no good reason not to use them
4. He would not have been injured had he made the other choice

Failing on any one of the four defeats the defense. And Blake makes the structural point: if a statutory violation was a proximate cause, sole proximate cause is unavailable as a matter of law, because the two cannot occupy the same ground. General safety instructions are not enough; the worker must have known the specific device was there and expected of him.

Which work activities are covered?

The statute lists them, and the list is closed: erection, demolition, repairing, altering, painting, cleaning or pointing of a building or structure.

Two boundaries do most of the work:

• Altering requires a significant physical change to the configuration or composition of the building. Cosmetic work does not qualify.
• Routine maintenance is excluded. Replacing components that wear out in the ordinary course is not “repairing,” even when done from a tall ladder. Genuine repair of something broken or inoperable is different.

Does the homeowner exemption apply?

The statute exempts owners of one and two-family dwellings who contract for but do not direct or control the work. Both halves must be satisfied, and the owner carries the burden of proving it.

“Direct or control” is read strictly. It means supervising the method and manner of the work, so the exemption generally survives an owner who:

• Hired the contractor, which the statute expressly contemplates
• Made design or aesthetic choices
• Monitored progress or approved finishes
• Was present at the site daily

Where it fails:

• Three-family and larger buildings. The exemption never applies.
• Purely commercial use. A one or two-family building used entirely for commercial purposes is outside it. Renovating to resell or rent is itself commercial.
• Mixed use is fact-specific. Where the work relates directly to the residential use of the home, the owner can remain protected even if there is also a commercial purpose.
• It does not extend to Labor Law 200 or common-law negligence. The exemption is written into sections 240 and 241 only.

How does this differ from Labor Law 241(6) and 200?

	240(1)	241(6)	200
Covers	Elevation and gravity hazards only	Construction, excavation and demolition areas generally	Any unsafe workplace condition
What you must prove	A device was absent or inadequate	Violation of a specific Industrial Code rule	Ordinary negligence, plus notice
Comparative fault	No defense	Available	Available
Supervision or control needed?	No, duty is non-delegable	No, duty is non-delegable	Yes
Homeowner exemption	Yes	Yes	No

Most construction cases plead all three, because they fail and succeed for different reasons.

Can you sue if you are collecting workers compensation?

Yes, and the two are not alternatives. Workers compensation is your remedy against your employer. A Labor Law 240(1) claim runs against the owner and general contractor, who are usually different companies.

Workers Compensation Law 29(1) says a worker injured by someone not in the same employ need not elect: benefits and a third-party lawsuit can both proceed. The compensation carrier holds a lien on what you recover, and settling the third-party case requires the carrier’s written consent or a court order.

Two traps worth knowing:

• If the owner is also your employer, or the person at fault is a co-worker, exclusivity can bar the claim.
• Timing. Where compensation has been awarded, section 29 imposes its own short deadline for starting the third-party action, after which the claim can be treated as assigned to the carrier. It is shorter than the ordinary three-year period.

An employer generally cannot be brought into the lawsuit for contribution unless the worker suffered a statutorily defined grave injury. That list is exhaustive rather than illustrative, and it is short.

How long do you have to sue?

Three years for a Labor Law claim under CPLR 214(5). But if the owner is a public body, everything changes: a notice of claim within 90 days and suit within one year and 90 days. Public authorities, school districts and the State each run on their own clock.

Note also that the 2026 amendment adding a fault bar to CPLR 1411 applies to motor vehicle cases under Insurance Law article 51. It does not reach construction Labor Law claims, where comparative fault was already no defense under 240(1).

Where these cases are heard in Nassau County

Construction Labor Law cases are brought in Supreme Court, Nassau County, at 100 Supreme Court Drive in Mineola. Nassau sits in the Tenth Judicial District with Suffolk, and appeals go to the Appellate Division, Second Department, whose decisions control here.

Related: suing a public entity and personal injury representation on Long Island.