Labor Law 241(6) and the Industrial Code in New York

What is Labor Law 241(6)?

Labor Law 241(6) requires that all areas where construction, excavation or demolition work is performed be constructed, shored, equipped, guarded, arranged, operated and conducted so as to provide reasonable and adequate protection to people working there or lawfully visiting.

Like the scaffold law, the duty is nondelegable: an owner or general contractor is liable without any proof that it supervised or controlled the work. Unlike the scaffold law, it is not limited to falls and falling objects. It reaches trips, slips, machinery, excavation, poor lighting and unsafe storage.

The trade-off is that it is much harder to plead.

How is it different from the scaffold law?

	241(6)	240(1), the scaffold law	200
Hazards covered	Any construction hazard covered by a specific rule	Gravity and elevation only	Any unsafe condition
What you must prove	Violation of a specific Industrial Code rule	A safety device was absent or inadequate	Negligence, plus notice or control
Supervision needed?	No, duty is nondelegable	No, duty is nondelegable	Yes
Your own carelessness	Is a defense	Is not a defense	Is a defense
Liability standard	Violation is some evidence of negligence for the jury	Absolute once violation and causation are shown	Ordinary negligence

That fourth row surprises people. Labor Law 241(6) is not absolute liability, and comparative fault does reduce a recovery here even though it cannot under 240(1). Most construction cases plead all three sections precisely because they succeed and fail for different reasons.

Why do so many 241(6) claims fail?

Because of the specificity requirement, which is the entire ballgame.

The statute only creates a nondelegable duty through the Commissioner’s rules, meaning the Industrial Code at 12 NYCRR part 23. And not every rule counts. Under Ross v. Curtis-Palmer Hydro-Electric Co., 81 N.Y.2d 494 (1993), only provisions “mandating compliance with concrete specifications” support a claim. Provisions that merely “establish general safety standards” do not.

In practice, a rule written around words like adequate, proper, safe, sufficient, effective or competent is usually dead on arrival, because it restates the ordinary duty of care rather than commanding anything in particular.

Two further requirements: the rule must actually apply to the facts, and the violation must be a proximate cause of the injury.

What changed in May 2026?

The Court of Appeals tightened the test, and it hit Nassau County harder than anywhere else in the state.

In Mann v. Mezuyon, LLC, 2026 NY Slip Op 03257, decided 26 May 2026, the Court held that 12 NYCRR 23-4.2(k) is not sufficiently specific. That rule says workers shall not be permitted to work where they may be struck or endangered by excavation equipment or falling material. The Court said it “fails to state any action, whatsoever, required to address the safety concerns” and merely contains a broad prohibition.

The Court also stated the test going forward: a provision must both identify a specific safety concern and command a specific action to address it.

Why this matters locally. The First, Third and Fourth Departments had already held 23-4.2(k) too general. The Second Department, which governs Nassau County, had held the opposite and allowed it. The Court of Appeals expressly disagreed with the Second Department’s position. So a rule that was a viable predicate in a Nassau excavation case before 26 May 2026 no longer is. Cases already pleading it need a different predicate.

Mann was decided four to three, and it has not yet been assigned a bound volume citation.

The decision closed a second door as well: a plaintiff cannot borrow specificity from a more concrete rule to prop up a vague one. Each predicate stands or falls on its own text.

Which Industrial Code rules actually work?

These are the provisions most often used successfully, along with how defendants attack them.

Rule	What it requires	Where these claims die
23-1.7(d) slipping	No slippery walking surface; ice, snow, water, grease and other foreign substances removed, sanded or covered	Whether the substance qualifies, and whether it was integral to the work
23-1.7(e)(1) passageways	Passageways kept free of dirt, debris, obstructions and tripping conditions	Whether the location was actually a passageway
23-1.7(e)(2) work areas	Floors and platforms free of debris, scattered tools, materials and sharp projections	The integral-to-the-work defense, which the defendant must prove
23-1.7(b)(1)(i) openings	Every hazardous opening a person may fall into guarded by a fastened cover or safety railing	Whether the opening was big enough, and whether covering it was inconsistent with the job
23-1.21(b)(4)(ii) ladders	Ladder footings must be firm; slippery surfaces and insecure objects such as bricks and boxes may not be used	Fact disputes about how the ladder actually failed
23-1.30 lighting	At least 10 foot candles where people work, and 5 in passageways and stairways	Proof. Testimony that it was “dark” is often not enough, and causation is the usual killer
23-2.1(a) storage	Materials stored safely, piles stable, not obstructing a passageway or thoroughfare	The location element

Note that 23-1.30 is one of the very few rules stating an actual number. That is exactly what makes it a valid predicate, and it illustrates the whole principle: numbers and commands survive, adjectives do not.

Which rules do not work?

• 23-1.5(a), general responsibility for health and safety. A general standard of care, so it cannot be a predicate.
• 23-1.5(c)(1), held insufficient by the Court of Appeals.
• 23-4.2(k), excavation struck-by, as of Mann in May 2026.
• 23-9.9(a), requiring a “trained and competent operator designated by the employer” to run a power buggy. Adding the word “designated” did not make it specific.
• 23-9.2(b)(1), equipment operated “in a safe manner at all times.”
• 23-2.1(b), disposal of debris.

An OSHA violation is not a substitute. The predicate must be a rule from part 23 of the Industrial Code. That is a frequent and fatal pleading error.

Is the routine maintenance exclusion the same as under the scaffold law?

Yes in effect. Section 241(6) reaches construction, excavation or demolition. Maintenance work disconnected from a construction project falls outside it, even though the Industrial Code’s own definition of construction work mentions maintenance.

Whether a task counts is judged in context. Work ancillary to a genuine construction project is usually covered; a standalone service call usually is not.

Does the homeowner exemption apply?

Yes, in the same form as under the scaffold law. Section 241 exempts owners of one and two-family dwellings who contract for but do not direct or control the work, and repeats that language in several subdivisions.

Two ways it fails:

• The owner directed the work. Telling a worker which boards to remove, supplying the materials and tools, and running the job is direction and control. Monitoring progress or approving finishes is not.
• The purpose was commercial. Renovating a residence for resale or rental is commercial work, judged by the owner’s intentions at the time of the injury.

Note that Labor Law 200 has no homeowner exemption at all. A homeowner outside the reach of 240 and 241 can still face an ordinary negligence claim.

Does the new 2026 comparative fault bar apply?

No. The 2026 amendment barring recovery where an injured person’s fault exceeds the defendant’s applies only to motor vehicle actions under the no-fault law. A construction claim is not one.

Construction cases stay under CPLR 1411(a) pure comparative fault, so a worker’s own carelessness reduces the award but never bars it. And under CPLR 1412 the defendant must plead and prove that carelessness.

The no-fault serious injury threshold does not apply to construction claims either. See comparative negligence in New York.

Who can be sued, and how long do you have?

Owners, contractors and their agents. A subcontractor becomes a statutory agent, and picks up the nondelegable duty, only within the scope of work actually delegated to it along with the authority to supervise and control that work. Job titles do not decide it; the delegated authority does.

The deadline is three years under CPLR 214. But public entities own a great deal of construction on Long Island, including the County, the towns, villages and school districts. Where the owner is one of them, a notice of claim within 90 days applies and the time to sue drops to one year and 90 days.

A Labor Law claim against the owner or general contractor is separate from workers compensation, which is the remedy against your employer. Both can proceed.

Where these cases are heard in Nassau County

Construction cases are brought in Supreme Court, Nassau County, at 100 Supreme Court Drive in Mineola, with appeals to the Appellate Division, Second Department. Personal injury trials in Nassau are commonly bifurcated, meaning liability is tried before damages.

Because Second Department decisions control here, and because the Court of Appeals has just overruled that department’s position on one commonly pleaded excavation rule, the choice of Industrial Code predicate in a Nassau construction case deserves a fresh look rather than a form pleading.

Related: the scaffold law, notice of claim requirements, and personal injury representation on Long Island.